

FINDING SECURITY CHAMPIONS IN BLENDS OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

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OVERVIEW

- Organisations use security policies and procedures to define how employees should ‘do their bit’ to protect the organisation and themselves.
- Policies assume a good fit with business processes and employees’ regular tasks. However, if the day-to-day reality of people’s jobs is not considered, policies can instead cause friction.
- By including employees, it can be easier to identify where policies cause friction, are ambiguous, or just do not apply to business processes. Doing so brings the organisation closer to *workable* security.
- Currently, involving employees in security leads to **security champions** as

- representatives of policy, rather than representatives of *employees’ security needs*.
- We have conducted secondary analysis [1] of 608 surveys deployed in a large partner organisation. Scenario-based survey questions are situated in realistic security dilemmas, to explore the role of security in employees’ working lives.
- Involving a diverse range of employees as ‘bottom-up’ agents to improve policy can complement existing ‘top-down’ policies. Employees must however be able to question policy; security behaviours and attitudes to policy can act as measures for how security is currently experienced and how to craft security awareness initiatives.

METHOD

- Each survey is personalised, containing four scenario-based questions based on situations identified in prior *in-depth interviews*;
- Each question offers four actions, with different security, social and productivity implications;
- Responses indicate individual **Behaviour Type** or **Maturity Level**;
- Combined distributions of Behaviour Types vs Maturity Levels indicate how security is approached in day-to-day work activities (see “Results”);
- We communicate this analysis for specific divisions in **Kiviat diagrams**;
- We also analyse 189 **voluntary comments** (see “Free Text Responses”).

BEHAVIOUR TYPES, INFORMED BY ADAMS [2]


- (**I**)ndividualists rely on themselves for solutions to problems.
- (**E**)galitarians rely on social or group solutions to problems.
- (**H**)ierarchists rely on existing systems or technologies for solutions.
- (**F**)atalists take a ‘naive’ approach, that their own actions do not create outcomes.

MATURITY LEVELS, AS DEFINED BY BEAUTEMENT ET AL. [3]

These maturity levels describe the relationship the individual has with the organisation and its security policy:

- 1 – **Uninfluenced:** Security behaviour is driven by personal knowledge.
- 2 – **Technically Controlled:** Technical controls enforce policy compliance.
- 3 – **Ad-hoc Knowledge and Application:** Shallow understanding of policy. Knowledge absorbed from surrounding work environment.
- 4 – **Policy Compliant:** Comprehensive knowledge and understanding of policy, and willing policy compliance.
- 5 – **Active Approach to Security:** Actively promote and advance security culture, carrying the intent of policy into work activities to support both security and business.

RESULTS: BEHAVIOUR TYPES + MATURITY LEVELS



Kiviat diagrams of distributions of behaviour types (axes) for maturity levels (edges) for (clock-wise starting top left) Sales & Services, Operations, Finance and Business divisions. **Core themes:**

Diverse responses to security: The composition of Behaviour Types and Maturity Levels varies strongly between Divisions, e.g. in the Finance division individuals at Level 2 are predominantly *Fatalist*, but switch to *Individualist* at higher levels of maturity and take more personal control of security;

No one-size-fits-all: Effective engagement with employees would ideally consider such variations (e.g., the large number of Level 5 *Hierarchists* in Sales & Services may already know policy, compared to the diverse behaviour types present in the Business division which would require a range of approaches to engage everyone, see diagrams above).

Policy can be informed from the ‘ground up’: employees can offer additional insights about their localised experience of security (see “Free Text Responses”).

FREE-TEXT RESPONSES

Voluntary responses give additional insights into how security fits into local practices:

Sales and Service; when considering sharing data insecurely:

“The employee is put in a no-win situation. If the business permit flexible working then the only allowable option here is for the data not to be sent.” (Hierarchist, Level 3 / ‘Ad-hoc’)

Business; when contemplating authorisations:

“Assuming the colleagues are from the same team and have the same clearance then they are equally trustworthy.” (Fatalist, Level 2 / ‘Ad-hoc’)

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3. Beautement, A., Becker, I., Parkin, S., Krol, K. & Sasse, A. in *Twelfth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2016)* (USENIX Association, Denver, CO, 2016), 253–270.

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